Barriers to Effective Nuclear Safety Cultures

Nuclear Safety Culture:

Competitiveness through Safety

Patrick W. O’Hara

January 10, 2000

ABSTRACT

In the age of deregulation, the nuclear power industry has had to find innovative ways to become competitive with the conventional power industry. One of the ways the nuclear industry seeks to compete is through superior human performance and an organizational culture that values safety. It is believed that the values displayed in a positive safety culture will yield a higher quality of work and foster greater attention to detail – elements that are the foundation of the nuclear industry. Conversely, the rise in worker’s accident rates indicates a negative safety culture that needs to be addressed by management. This paper begins with a narrative of Senior Management identifying a declining safety culture, and placing the blame on management, leaving the reader questioning how to resolve the issue. The paper describes the importance of safety in the nuclear industry and the safety culture as a means of gaining a competitive advantage. Emphasis is placed on the human factors of performance rather than technology, and addresses the common missteps taken by management, while suggesting strategies for implementing and strengthening the safety cultures. This paper concludes with a narrative of how the Senior Management should resolve the issue of the declining safety culture.

Safety Issues Come to a head

It was the last Friday of the month, the day to review plant safety. The safety manager sat before the plant leadership team (PLT) and the various department managers, reading off the monthly and year to date safety incident report. There had been a total of forty-one first aide cases, ten recordable on-the-job accidents, and three lost-time accidents so far this year. All of the managers held their heads down low, as the safety manager read the numbers by department. The department managers from security and maintenance felt beads of sweat roll off their foreheads, as these departments were singled-out for the worst safety record in the plant, responsible for 33 percent and 26 percent of the incidents respectively. They could feel the heat of everyone staring at them, even as they looked down toward the table. Even the department managers who were fortunate enough not to have employees on the list became uncomfortable as the safety manager began pounding his fists on the table claiming that employees were not taking safety seriously enough. They were all fortunate that no one was seriously injured, and that most of the incidents were just minor injuries, but they knew that was not the issue. They trembled as the plant manager stood up and began yelling “People are not paying attention to detail! They are cutting corners! Our safety culture has become unacceptable!” He let them all know that he intended to hold the managers accountable for their department’s safety performance. Everyone knew that if the following month’s numbers did not improve, it would affect everyone’s variable pay. The Plant Manager asked his subordinates what they intended to do about the safety record. No one dared to speak. All of the managers heard the Plant Manager tell them that they were at fault for the decline in the safety culture. Many were not sure how, or what they could do to improve it. All of the managers knew they had to go back to their respective departments, talk with their subordinates supervisors and employees, and resolve the issues that were negatively affecting the safety culture.

· What is the problem that is causing the rise in accidents?

· How should management deal with its employees?

· How can management improve the safety record?

· How can management save their bonuses?

NUCLEAR SAFETY

The emphasis on safety and reliability has always been the policy cornerstone of the U.S. nuclear industry. Anything less undermines the basic argument that gave rise to the nuclear industry through the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which turned over the control of nuclear power from the United States (U.S.) Department’s of Energy (DOE) and Defense (DOD) to private entities through individual licenses, based on the contractual promise of safe operation.[1] Regardless of ones feelings about the nuclear industry, it has to be recognized that nuclear energy is the second largest source of electricity in the U.S., providing about 20% of the nations energy mix.[2] Thus, unsafe operation of nuclear facilities not only jeopardizes the employee’s high-rent job, but also further imperils the nation’s economic well-being, and America’s standard of living.

The debate over the nuclear power industry revolves primarily around the issue of safety, in both operation and disposal of nuclear waste. Therefore, the issue of poor safety performance also undermines public confidence. Any technological advances in nuclear safety will do little to change that perception. The unfortunate result of the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI-2) and Chernobyl was the end of prospects for growth in the nuclear power industry. Often overlooked are the root causes of such accidents. At TMI-2, the causal factors were human performance errors in which an operator disabled a safety system that was correcting a water flow problem because the operator believed that the instrumentation was reporting inaccurate information. At Chernobyl, poor reactor design – no containment structure to prevent the release of radioactivity -- and the absence of safety systems and procedures were the root cause. As such, the focus of the U.S. nuclear power industry has been on addressing such human performance errors, emphasizing operating experience and promoting a culture of safety that is necessary to mitigate potential problems.

Safety also has a role of growing importance in nuclear regulation, as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has often been accused of having “a culture of tolerance, ” in “turn[ing] a blind-eye to long-standing problems and poor management” at the nation’s nuclear facilities.[3] The charge was based on the NRC’s oversight program, the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performances (SALP) did not address the area of safety.[4] The SALP assessment is performed once every four every years – looking back over that time period -- and focusing on the four functional areas of the nuclear organization – operations, engineering, support services, and maintenance. In March 1999, the NRC implemented a new Reactor Inspection and Oversight Program which would better balance the agency’s need to effectively regulate the industry with a smaller staff and budget, while simultaneously applying greater regulatory attention to facilities with performance problems, and reducing regulatory attention on facilities that perform well. It also changed the regulatory program from one that addressed problems after the fact, to one that is more proactive in monitoring current safety and performance trends.

The NRC’s new program focuses on three safety cornerstones. The first being reactor safety, which focuses on four elements; initiating events (those that could lead to an accident); mitigation systems (the safety systems that lessen the severity of an accident); barrier integrity (maintaining barriers to the release of radioactivity in an accident); and emergency preparedness (the plans put in place to protect the public in the event of an emergency). The second is radiation safety for the plant worker and the public, which seeks to respectively minimize exposure to workers and maximize protection of the public during routine operations. The third is related to the physical protection of the plant and the nuclear fuel. Among these three cornerstones are three critical crosscutting elements; human performance, management’s attention to safety and worker’s ability to raise safety issues (a “safety-conscious” work environment), and finding and fixing problems (a corrective action program).[5] From a licensee standpoint, increased performance and less regulatory oversight is the best way to achieve competitiveness, and therefore the organization should commit itself to achieving these three crosscutting elements.

Safety has quickly become an industry performance measure, and part of its strategic commitment. Although the NRC performs official regulation of the industry, organizations such as the International Nuclear Power Organization (INPO) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) have a stake in promoting safety and performance goals for the industry as a means of providing data for policy making efforts. Nuclear power companies also have a stake in membership, as these organizations spread operating experience throughout the industry, striving to improve the performance of all its members. As such, these organizations also inspect nuclear sites, and put considerable pressure on members who are performing marginally. These organizations monitor member’s records in the areas of plant operations, human performance, procedural adherence, and safety. Members are rated annually on a performance index based on several factors: Among them are industrial safety, collective radiation exposure, and safety system availability.

Drawing upon the concepts of W. Edward Deming’s Total Quality Management (TQM), the nuclear power industry sought to address the public’s concerns about nuclear power through a “Total Safety Culture” (TSC).[6] Deming believed in a concept of “fitness for use,” whereby a product or service would satisfy a customer’s real needs. Furthermore, he believed that a “constancy of purpose,” – an unwavering focus on an organization’s mission – combined with statistical quality control, would lead to ever-improving quality at lower costs.[7] In the same manner, the nuclear power industry is maximizing its commitment to the public’s real needs – safe, reliable, and cost-competitive power alternatives, while revolving the industry’s mission around safety as a means of improving quality and lowering costs. The industry also integrated Deming’s core belief that it was management’s responsibility to seek out and correct the causes of failure, rather than merely identify failures after they occur. The same approach needs to be applied to safety, and is part of the safety culture.

THE SAFETY CULTURE

A safety culture is a subset of the overall organizational culture. “The safety culture of an organization is the product of the individual group values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety program.”[8] Organizations with a positive safety culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence in the efficiency of preventative measures. A positive safety culture implies that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts – a synergistic relationship between management, the union, and the public. Positive safety cultures are characterized by the importance of leadership and the commitment of the Chief Executive, as well as the executive safety role of line management. Positive safety cultures rely on the involvement of all employees, and effective communications of commonly understood and agreed upon goals. Positive safety cultures should have good organizational learning, and be responsive to change. “Manifest attention to workplace safety and health and a questioning attitude” are tantamount to a positive safety culture. Negative safety cultures are characterized by “a commitment of some individuals strangled by the cynicism of others.”[9] An effective safety culture is dependant on strong organizational values. An integrated organizational culture is characterized by sub-group cooperation, a strong corporate identity, a positive organizational climate, and high employee morale -- all of which creates a positive impact on the safety culture. A discordant organizational structure on the other hand is characterized by a weak corporate identity, sub-group divisiveness, a negative organizational climate and poor employee morale -- all of which creates a negative impact on the safety culture.[10]

The whole concept of safety culture came about after the TMI-2 accident, which proliferated due to a series of human errors that later caused mechanical failures. The Kemeny Commission, appointed by President Carter, investigated the accident and came to several conclusions. Of utmost importance was that the nuclear power industry “must drastically change its attitudes toward safety and regulations” and “must also set and police its own standards of excellence to ensure the effective management and safe operation of nuclear power plants.” They further concluded that if there were one area to find fault with, it would be traced to human error.[11] The incident at Chernobyl reinforced the need for nuclear safety cultures, and quickly dispelled the notion that nuclear power safety could be established once and then left in automatic.[12]

The inherent problem with the nuclear safety culture is creating and maintaining a safety infrastructure that is self-sustaining. Management has the most important role in the safety culture, not because they have authority, but because they have the resources to foster a bottom-up buy-in of the organization’s values. A top-down approach does not create a sustaining safety culture. It is a generally accepted theory that in order to change a behavior, attitudes must be changed, which generally come from experience.[13] A TSC must create self-esteem, a sense of belonging, and personal control. These states are critical to developing employees that feel responsible for their own safety, their peer’s safety, and the organizational climate that supports the culture.[14] Management sets the tone, and needs to focus more on removing barriers to safety excellence than controlling behavior. Thus, management has to treat employees fairly, be consistent in their actions, and be a good role model for the safety culture it desires. Traditional command and control tactics, such as “divide and conquer” will only undermine the safety culture. The importance of trust between management and its subordinates cannot be understated. Without mutual trust and respect, employees lose faith in the defined organizational values and will reject new initiatives to safety.[15]

HUMAN PERFORMANCE

As previously mentioned, the nuclear industry shares operating information among the various licensees of atomic energy. This occurs both as a licensee requirement and from membership in the various nuclear organizations. Furthermore, members of the nuclear industry do not consider themselves competing against each other, but rather against the newer more efficient gas-fired combined-cycle plants.[16] Because of this, it is very unlikely that any nuclear power station would gain a long-term competitive advantage against other nuclear operators through technology. The industry instead has turned to investing in human performance as a means to gain a competitive advantage. Innovation in this area will also put the nuclear industry in a better position for competition against the conventional utilities in the future.[17] Human performance is one of the crosscutting elements of the nuclear safety culture.

Several competitive elements of human performance are indicative of the nuclear safety culture. Competition resulting from operating experience, based on a frame of reference acquired through actual tenure, or through knowledge-sharing with other nuclear utilities has contributed to both operating efficiency and the safety culture. “Lessons Learned,” a strategy that shares mistakes and consequences with the entire organizations also contributes and creates awareness toward the same goals. These types of organizational learnings are designed to improve future performance through knowledge gained through experiences. Encouraging a questioning attitude also is a means by which the nuclear organization polices itself and identifies problems before they occur.

Another obvious source of competitiveness is reducing the organizational costs associated with accidents or poor safety culture. “An accident can be defined as an unplanned event which results in injury or ill health to people, damage or loss to plant, materials, property or the environment, or a loss of business opportunity.”[18] At first glance, one might ask how emphasis an on safety can improve the bottom line. The National Safety Council reports the following statistics on work place injuries:[19]

· Eighty-five percent of slips, trips, and falls causing injuries resulted from unsafe acts.

· There were over 5100 workplace fatalities in 1998 due to unintentional injuries. Another 1200 or so workplace deaths a year are due to suicides and homicides.

· At work there is a fatal injury every 103 minutes and a disabling injury every 8 seconds.

· The four leading causes of death in 1998 were traffic safety accidents, homicide, falls to a lower level, and being struck by an object.

· Work place injuries cost Americans $125.1 billion in 1998.

The nuclear industry is particularly vulnerable to accidents by the vary nature of the industry. On the conventional side of the plant there are obvious hazards associated with most power stations, such as high voltage electricity, pressurized steam that turns the turbine, and a variety of hazardous materials including flammable gases, combustible liquids, and chemicals of all sorts. The nuclear side poses additional hazards such as radiation exposure, and possible contamination. Both sides have multiple elevations, with numerous openings and cranes for moving equipment. Thus, accidents in the workplace have the potential to create exorbitant medical bills, increased insurance costs, increased workers compensations costs, likely increases in regulatory oversight, and cause a decline in stakeholder confidence in the safe operation of the plant.

Another factor that may sometimes be overlooked is the labor-intensive nature of the nuclear industry. A typical 1000 mega-watt nuclear plant probably employs about 650 workers, compared to a fossil-fuel plant that may only employ 100 workers.[20] The statistical consequence of having more employees is likely to predispose the nuclear industry to a greater rate of accidents, and another reason why safety is so important to monitor and control. Fitness for duty -- which encompasses physical, psychological, and emotional fitness -- is also a concern of the nuclear industry, which left uncontrolled could lead to increased accidents. Fitness for duty programs, a requirement of the NRC, provide random and ‘for cause’ drug and alcohol testing, as well as routine monitoring of physical and psychological health. Programs are also in place for early detection of employee aberrancy. Another factor influencing human performance is the 24-hour nature of the industry as a typical reactor is designed for a 545-day continuous run. A 1997 Harris Poll considered the effect of businesses that operate 24 hours a day, and quantified the negative effects on human performance due to the affects of sleep loss, which it estimated to be about $18 million. It reported that human errors at night were twice as likely as during the day, and productivity fell approximately 30 to 40 percent after midnight. Furthermore, night workers reported experiencing more physiological ailments such as headaches, fatigue, stress, muscle pain, and respiratory infections – all associated with increases in absenteeism, higher employee turnover, and increased training costs.[21] This factor is particularly important considering incidents such as TMI-2, Chernobyl, and even the Exxon Valdez occurred during early morning hours, and resulted from human error.

Because of the redundant nature of the safety systems and the delicate equilibrium in which the reactor operates, even human errors that seem nominal at best, can have dramatic effects on plant performance and operating costs. Consider an employee who is walking through one of the many narrow corridors of the plant and accidentally bumps into a price of equipment. The machine senses vibration, and automatically shuts downs (trips). Such an incident would initiate a reportable event monitored by the NRC, which could create increased regulatory oversight, and moreover, create a loss of revenue of over $100,000 a hour. Many times, it takes 24 hours or more for the plant to come back on-line after a reactor trip, costing the company upwards of $2.5 million a day in lost revenue. The safety culture seeks to address these avoidable incidents, through constant attention to detail, and a high level of care in all activities. Avoiding these types of incidents is the difference between a company with a strong safety culture, and one without.

The nuclear industry uses several means of tracking its human performance. One of the most important tools is the Deviation Event Report (DER).[22] A DER is designed to report and track events that occur outside of the norm – work not performed as described in the procedure, machinery not performing per its specifications, or even as a means of documenting that their isn’t a procedure or norm for some new task. The DER system is a formal process, whereby any person initiates a specific problem, providing sufficient information for it to be logged based on the department it involved, and the department that initiated it. When the DER involves a human performance error (HPE), the HPE is categorized using a complex algorithm, as consequential (a precursor to a safety related problem) or non-consequential. The DER remains open until it is resolved through some defined corrective action. Once the DER is in motion, it cannot be stopped until it is resolved. The intention behind the DER system is to track problems that have occurred in the plant. By trending the information, there is a ready source of information available to determine if the corrective actions taken to resolve the initial problem have mitigated reoccurrence. The DER is also a mechanism of empowerment to employees, because anyone can initiate it, under the theory that there will be no retribution for a questioning attitude: Employee concerns cannot be overlooked. Such empowerment, however, has the potential to create friction between the organization, management, and the employee who initiated the DER. Consider the example of an employee who discovered that a step in a preventive maintenance sequence was left out during a maintenance outage. Such a DER will yield an investigation into the practices of all involved, from procedure writers, to workers, to material handlers, QA inspectors, and even senior management. More important than the finger pointing pressure, are the costs to the organization if the plant needs to shut down for re-work. Such an action could cost the company about $100,000 of lost revenue per hour, not to mention the opportunity costs of shutting down production. However, such attention to detail and a questioning attitude is critical to a positive safety culture.

Accident rates are also recorded through the DER process, and tracked by the safety department. These incidents are trended under one of three categories. First aid cases are injuries where the employee received treatment and immediately returned back to work. Recordable incidents are those in which the employee’s injury required advanced treatment, or perhaps had to be reassigned to light duty. Lost time accidents are those in which an employee was not able to return to work. Both recordable and lost time accidents are required to be recorded in the plant’s OSHA 200 logs. [23]

“SAFETY CONSCIOUS” WORK ENVIRONMENT

The safety conscious environment is the second crosscutting element of the safety culture. Management sets the tone for safety in the nuclear setting. All the posters, slogans, and incentives mean little if the manager does not buy in to the culture. Some industry consultants have even gone as far as saying that safety is like a religion, either you truly believe it or you do not.[24] Employees must feel that their concerns will be treated seriously by management, and without retribution. Managers putting on the false façade of safety, dealing with problems after they occur rather than before, are only undermining the safety culture. “Managers must be careful to create an organizational environment in which each person is motivated to reveal and correct adverse conditions rather than to conceal such problems and potential problems”[25]

The DER process is a means for an employee to raise a safety concerns if not supported by his organization. Another program, put in place is the “Speakout” program, where employees can voice concerns, as with the DER process, but in a more empirical way. Concerns are documented by a non-operations section of the plant, and reported to both the corporate office and the NRC. The concern is investigated, and the results given to the concerned party. Concerns can be raised either in-person, by mail, or anonymously. This program is required by the NRC and is modeled similar to the federal whistle-blowers legislation.

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM

The third crosscutting element is the corrective action program. As with each DER or Speak Out initiation, an appropriate corrective action must be activated by management. The most important aspect of the corrective action is to identify, and solve the root cause. Many times management provides corrective actions to symptoms, rather than problems. These missteps are revealed through the DER trend analysis, which reveals repeat incidents, suggesting the true cause had not been corrected. As such, it is important to thoroughly investigate incidents for the root cause, and provide an appropriate corrective action. These actions should also be performed in a timely manner. Thus, backlogs on resolving DERs, speak out issues, or even maintenance issues detract from the safety culture.

ORGANIZATIONAL BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION

Nuclear Safety consultants contend that management styles are noticeably different between satisfactory and unsatisfactory plants. One of the main elements often found in unsatisfactory plants are weaknesses in the communication interface.[26] Management’s role in balancing the principles, policies, objectives, and safety culture among the functional areas is often constrained by its inability to communicate between the top and bottom of the organization. Too often a message is forced downward through the chain of command and loses its meaning by time it gets to the line workers. The importance of building a bottom-up safety culture cannot be over emphasized.[27] The goal should be to make safety a value, not a priority.

The division of labor and coordination of effort in nuclear plants can be described by the organizational theory of a ‘machine bureaucracy.’[28] This type of bureaucracy is characterized by “highly specialized, routine operating tasks, very formalized procedures in the operating core, proliferation of rules, regulations, and formalized communication throughout the organization, large scale units at the operating level, reliance on the functional basis for grouping tasks, relatively centralized power for decision making; and an elaborate administrative structure with a sharp distinction between line and staff.”[29] This necessary bureaucracy may actually work against the safety culture. Often times routine tasks become the casual factor of human performance errors because they are so routine that employees find ways to cut steps out of the process. The formality of procedures, and the clear lines of authority also constrain the competitive nature of empowering employees. Furthermore, the emphasis on technical knowledge and functional experience also detracts from its ability to promote quality management. Following the cliché of the ‘Peter Principle,’ an excellent staff level technical advisor may not necessarily make a good line or strategic manager, strictly by virtue of a lack of formalized management training.[30] Conversely, the need for top management to possess nuclear plant operating licenses detracts from a strong strategic manager’s ability from holding a top-level position in the nuclear industry by virtue of a lack of formal technical and or engineering education.

The nuclear industry also appears to be constrained in its ability to recruit new pre-qualified employees. The decline of the military coupled with the perception of a declining nuclear industry has drawn many would-be students from the field. Historically, many nuclear workers have come from the military, especially the U.S Navy because of its extensive nuclear propulsion program. This was a source of both highly technical, and skilled workers that were preconditioned to the nuclear safety culture. As such, there is an increasing risk in the long-term implications of recruiting people outside of the nuclear industry who may not buy-in to the nuclear safety culture.[31] Interestingly enough, this development has created greater job security for current nuclear employees, and a willingness on the part of the employer to invest more its employees. The detriment is a workforce whose demographics are becoming increasingly older, and may cause problems in the future if appropriate job candidates are not found and trained timely enough to gain the operating experience to match current employees, thus having negative effects on the safety culture.

INCENTIVES FOR SAFETY

There seems to be some disagreement among safety practitioners over the merits of safety incentives related to traditional measurements of safety in promoting the safety culture. Instead, some believe that safety incentives, or even measurement systems lead to under reporting of incidents or manipulation of data.[32] How valid is a lost time accident counter if the record keeper manipulates the data just to keep the counter from resetting? This creates tremendous peer pressure to not report accidents, or manipulate the data such as giving employees paid time-off rather than recording it as lost-time, or shifting recordable incidents to unreported first aid cases. “Giving rewards for avoiding an injury seems reasonable and logical. But it really leads to covering up minor injuries and a distorted picture of safety performance.”[33] This undermines the very nature of the safety culture that is built on the foundations of TQM. Contemporary safety experts are advocating shifting the focus from injury rate based incentives to safety participation programs.[34]

The intent behind the safety incentive is to recognize and reward safe performance, not to withhold or alter data. Some experts believe that safety incentive programs should focus on process rather than outcomes, which is what employees and management have direct control over, not just variations in statistics.[35] The goal should be to encourage and reward individuals for safety consciousness and participation. This is the only means of developing the relationship between safety, production, and quality that is tantamount to the safety culture. “Safety performance must be a measure of success – not an analysis of failure. A proper training program, effective supervision, and good human relations motivate more than [traditional safety] awards.”[36]

EMPHASIS ON PROCESS SAFETY

Process safety has always been an important part of the nuclear safety culture, because the manner in which work is performed reflects the organizational values – in this case safety performance. Simply put, process safety refers to the manner in which work is performed, which mitigates risks while maximizing the performance values of the culture. Process-based safety is a more objective measure of safety than the traditional means of measuring accidents. It is also a factor that is easier for the worker to control than traditional measurements of safety, which is important when safety is linked to pay – the theory that the goal is attainable.[37] Process safety is also an outward expression of the safety culture, such as employees wearing personal protective equipment (PPE) for routine tasks. It shows that employees are serious about safety, and provides positive role modeling (attitudes) for other employees, which reinforces positive behavior.

ADDRESSING THE SAFETY ISSUE

The problem with the decline in the safety culture is not the rise in accidents, per se, as much as it is the articulation of a symptom of poor performance. Management needs to identify the root cause of the poor performance, which may be different between each department. Management should begin by clearly reiterating the organizational goals and values, and make sure that employees understand them and believe in them. The managers need to emphasize the role of safety in the organization as a measure of performance, and the implied correlation between the rise of accidents with the increased likelihood of poor performance in the future. They should also focus on the three crosscutting factors of the safety culture: human performance, a safety conscious environment, and a good corrective action program. Too often managers seek out a worker as the root cause, which is rarely the case unless the poor performance is deliberate or repeated due to carelessness. Accountability rests with management since it is management that selects, trains, assigns, and supervises the worker.[38] It should be assumed that employee selection is not the problem, since not all of the accidents have been caused by the same person, nor have they been the result of new employees. Training could be a variable, as different departments put different emphasis on safety training, but not the lone factor. For instance, the Security department does no industrial safety training each year, while the maintenance department averages about 24 hours of safety specific training a year. Job assignments may be a problem if accidents occur during routine operations, suggesting that the nature of repetitive work may cause a decline in performance. Perhaps rotating jobs, work shifts, and assignments would create a fresh outlook, and overcome complacency. Staffing levels should also be considered a factor. Too many people may increase the propensity for complacency, while not enough raising levels of stress and anxiety. The backlog in maintenance coupled with management’s emphasis on keeping on schedule may also be causing the maintenance worker to work faster, thereby undermining excellence. Supervision can also be the problem. The question often asked in an accident investigation, “Where was the Supervisor?” Field supervision has been known to change behaviors, as described in the “Hawthorn Studies,” and could be used as a means of reinforcing positive behaviors while building relationships between management and employer.[39]

Managers should reflect upon their management style, and do a critical self-assessment of their role in influencing the organization. Is the management style consistent with the goals of the organization, or could it be construed as counter productive? Management also needs to ask themselves about their relationships with their subordinates. Is it built on trust and respect, or command and control? How does the management style influence behavior – positively or negatively? How well does the manager know his employee? How are communications between levels? Do employees feel comfortable expressing concerns to management? If they do not, or do not do it often, communications could be an important part of the problem.

In the nuclear industry, it is critical for the manager to know about an employee’s obstacles, both personal and professional, and strive to help remove them. Nuclear managers need to have much more direct and personal knowledge of their employees to foster a positive safety culture. As such, social factors such as morale are important considerations for employee behavior and productivity.

As stated before the nuclear safety culture is designed to create synergy between management and union and non-union employees. It is meant to ensure safety in conjunction with reliability and profitability. It also means meeting the competitive demands of deregulation for the economic survival of the nuclear industry.

NOTES