The
Dynamics of Organizational Learning in the Nuclear Power Industry
Patrick W. O’Hara
October 2000
The Dynamics
of Nuclear Power
The pressures of increased competition and the demands of a rapidly changing marketplace have affected the nuclear power industry. Deregulation has been one of the main drivers of change, forcing a separation of power producers and transmission services. These pressures have forced a renewed emphasis on cost control and operating efficiency while balancing the needs for operational safety and reliability.[1] At the same time, this reorganization has precipitated a rebirth of the nuclear power industry, creating a segmentation and consolidation of the energy industry, whereby new companies seek competitive advantage through better control of their organizational factors. Like other industries, transformational leadership and culture change efforts have been implemented in an effort to build corporate identity, redefine group values, articulate strategic direction, and embrace the importance of multidimensional teamwork as the keys to success in a rapidly changing organization. The programs, while initially effective in turning around or redirecting an organization, are limited in their long-term effectiveness by virtue of their dependence on internal changes to leadership or cultural norms. The nuclear power industry will benefit more from an organizational learning approach, which is more dynamic, fluid, and responsive to both internal and external imperatives.
Jacobs and Haber define five general categories of factors that affect the safety and reliability goals of the nuclear industry.[2] The first, “administrative knowledge,” refers to the knowledge of the organization and the formalization of operations by way of policy and procedures. The second is an emphasis on communications, recognizing the importance of multidimensional communication both internally and externally. The third is based on decision making, which they define as goal prioritization and organizational learning: the extent to which plant personnel and the organization use knowledge gained from past experience to improve future performance. The fourth category reflects human resource allocation, which includes areas such as performance evaluation, managing technical knowledge and training. The fifth is based on culture, which they distinguish as emphasis on ownership, safety culture, and time urgency. While Jacobs and Haber’s assessment appears comprehensive, it gives a limiting perspective of to the role of organizational learning, which should likely be an element of each of the five general categories.
The breadth of organizational learning as a developmental model for the nuclear industry far surpasses traditional change models, such as those proposed by Bass and Avolio,[3] or Schein.[4] The concept of change management through organizational learning appears more appropriate because it allows for a “holistic” approach, which may be tailored in scope to the industry. The dynamics of the nuclear industry demand more than a singular focus on any one factor. Moreover, the approach must be able to operate in the context of an evolving organizational culture that emphasizes a static sociotechnical system that is inherent to the nuclear industry: A man-machine interface that is driven by safety and reliability, otherwise known as the “nuclear safety culture.” Technology can be managed by rigid engineering controls. To appreciate the dynamics of the human factors on the sociotechnical system, a greater emphasis must be placed on how these elements affect the worker, operating in a unique environment.
A Different
Breed
The nuclear organization has evolved into a different breed of organization that is relatively segmented from other types of organizations. A primary classification often used to describe the industry is that of a high-reliability organization (HRO): a term used to describe organizations that are mandated to do everything possible to avoid certain kinds of negative outcomes.[5] In short, the ordinary operation of nuclear facilities has the capacity to permanently damage surrounding communities, more distant inhabitants, the natural environment, and even future generations, through everyday operational activities.[6] Such distinction has created the need for a high degree of regulation, from both government and industrial organizations, as well as a need to manage public perceptions of the risk of operations. Regulation has created a labor-intensive industry due to the mandate to manage contingencies. The need to conform to regulations has also created a “machine bureaucracy” of sorts,[7] where most activities are reduced to a policy or procedure, leaving little room for individual discretion or creativity. Other examples of HROs are the aviation and aerospace industry, which take the same approach to organizational management as the nuclear industry, emphasizing the importance of safety culture and organizational factors as a means of creating and sustaining a safe and reliable organization.[8] Nonetheless, the typology of the aviation industry has been characterized as “decomposable,” – placing a greater dependency on localized actions and analysis for organizational management -- rather than the distinction of the nuclear industry, which is characterized as systemic, or “holistic.”[9] Such analysis validates the need for a greater approach to organizational management than traditional systems.
The nuclear industry is further segmented by several unique characteristics. First, the workforce is very homogenous. Diversity experts would characterize the nature of the industry based on shared primary and secondary dimensions,[10] which is represented by a male-dominated, engineering-oriented workforce with a militaristic background. At first glance, this may seem discriminatory, yet the predominant applicant pool for nuclear power operations has historically been from the U.S. Navy’s nuclear propulsion program – which is predominantly male, and engineering-oriented. This applicant pool has been attractive to the industry, as these candidates have been preconditioned to the culture of the HRO and the emphasis on safety culture largely due to the efforts of the visionary leadership of Admiral Hyman Rickover, a man considered the father of the nuclear navy.[11] Many of the values and norms espoused by him during the advent of nuclear energy as a source of productive power (circa 1940), have become deeply engrained in the nuclear organization, and remain the basis of the “nuclear safety culture.”
Another characteristic of the industry is its view of competition. Today’s nuclear plant operators do not consider other nuclear plant operators as direct competitors, but more as a resource to help the industry become more competitive, through the mandated and voluntary sharing of operating experience. Instead, competition is considered the operator of the lowest-cost energy alternative, which today is the natural gas cogeneration facility.[12] As such, the competitiveness of the industry is based less on technology, and more on the development of its human resources, policies and procedures. This is particularly interesting because a nuclear organization’s success is not necessarily dependant on another nuclear operator’s failure. In fact, the failure of any one nuclear operator may actually jeopardize the entire industry. This creates the need for a strong support network, and heavy internal criticism for poor performers. The competitive nuclear operator will thus be the one that is able to build and retain a highly skilled and motivated workforce. Such emphasis will likely reduce risk, aid in meeting productivity and quality demands, control costs of injuries and catastrophe, while meeting the demands for innovation and growth.[13] The relationship between a quality workforce and technology in the deliverance of safety and reliability in nuclear power organizations has driven its characterization as a sociotechnical system, whereby any malfunctioning element of the system – an employee or mechanical component – may disrupt the entire system.[14]
A Need for
Continuous Learning
The dynamics of the nuclear power industry demand a multidimensional approach to organizational learning. A first dimension rests on the need to develop innovative systems and work practices internally for market competitiveness. A second dimension rests on the need to manage the regulatory oversight process. A third dimension rests on the need to share information among the industry to guarantee the safety and reliability of nuclear operations, thus assuring public confidence in nuclear energy as a viable alternative to conventional fossil fueled generation. A fourth dimension rests with the development of the nuclear workforce – the greatest asset and investment to the modern nuclear organization.
The compilation of “lessons learned” within the organization and its proliferation through feedback loops is one of the most important aspects of competitiveness at the plant level. Lessons learned stem from post job critiques, whereby organizational and production factors are discussed to identify problems, both apparent and latent, that affected the performance of individual tasks and jobs. The goal of lessons learned is to build into future work packages all of the contingencies to anticipate, avoid, and solve similar problems that may arise in future work. There are three basic objectives to lessons learned. First, to reduce the time it takes to complete a job, thus shortening periods of generation outage or limiting conditions of operation. Second, to reduce the costs to complete a job, based on timelines for staged tools, labor, and technical expertise, which may be refined through the process. Third, to increase the ability to avoid risk by documenting transients and system interactions, which further bolsters the goals of safety and reliability within the organization.
Developing a system to deal with regulatory issues is also important. This generally requires the organization to develop mechanisms to adapt to changes in regulatory policy, which involves continually improving internal policy, procedures, and work practices. The sharing of operating experience among nuclear operators is also important, as a means of culminating cumulative industry operating experience: nuclear operators benefit from the successes and failures of their counterparts, and may model programs so as to repeat or avoid similar events depending on circumstances. The need also extends to regulatory violations, in determining the causes, and taking precautions to assure that the same negative events are not repeated. This type of organizational learning benefits the organization internally, and serves as a mechanism to warn other operators in the industry of potential regulatory issues. Many of the violations in the nuclear industry require self-reporting under federal regulation. No doubt, operators that may avoid regulatory pitfalls are likely to be less burdened by the intense scrutiny of regulatory inspections, or the negative public perceptions of stakeholders that accompanies enforcement actions.
The development of human resources is the key to competitiveness in the nuclear industry. Many in the industry characterize optimization of its workforce as the “nuclear safety culture.” More than a culture per se, it is a definition of a sociotechnical system, much like that of TQM. It involves the relationship between humans and technology, and focuses on factors that affect human performance, such as employee mindset, work practices, and procedural adherence. This emphasis places greater responsibility on proactive workforce planning and organizational development. The systemic nature of the change process, however, must be recognized as a potential negative influence on operational outcomes, such as increasing worker anxiety or creating distractions from the task. As such, the static nature of the sociotechnical system is the source of stability, rather than the organizational culture: the safety culture represents those core values that need to be so deeply ingrained in the nuclear organization, that they are never changed, or affected by complacency.
The greatest challenge to the nuclear industry over the next ten years will be to transfer this knowledge to a new generation of nuclear operators, as the renewing of the life cycle of nuclear power has created a situation whereby the current generation of operators will likely retire around the same time.[15] The organizational learning system must capture the need to pass-on lessons learned, operating experience, and regulatory issues in a complete, yet efficient manner.
Elements of a
Learning Culture
Schein identifies ten characteristics of a learning culture, which he attributes to the success of an organization to make its own “perpetual diagnosis” and self-manage transformation as needed.[16] Many of these characteristics are inherent of the nuclear organization. The first characteristic identified is a dominant organization in the organization-environment relationship. The assumption is that the organization, through leadership, vision and shared assumptions, must actively manage the business environment. The second characteristic calls for a proactive approach to the nature of human activity, thus encouraging the identification of problems from all levels of the organization, and implementation of corrective actions. The third characteristic is a pragmatic sense of reality and truth, which articulates the need for diversity in problem solving, rather than relying on the way that things have always been done. The fourth characteristic has to do with assumptions about human nature. The learning culture needs a work environment that fosters the assumption that humans are good and that their nature is mutable. This is likely to pose a serious obstacle to the industry due to the predominance of organized labor in the utility industry and the fact that supervisory positions are often filled for technical expertise over progressive management skills. The fifth characteristic revolves around the nature of human relations, specifically the questions of groupism vs. individualism, and the level of authority and control. The nuclear industry is consistent with Schein’s assessment of a midline approach, as inclusion to the group and teamwork are important, yet the ability to standout, disagree and advocate an alternative are equally important. Although participative systems have been the initiator of many creative solutions, the required bureaucracy and centralization of authority often affects implementation. The sixth characteristic relates to orientation of time, in which a near-future orientation that looks ahead to see if process changes are working, is considered optimal. The seventh characteristic is rooted in the need for communication, which Schein believes must include the assumption that “multichannel” communication and information are central to the learning organization. The eighth characteristic relates to the question of sub-cultural uniformity versus diversity. Schein advocates high-diversity over uniformity. The nuclear organization, however, is built on standardization of work practices through a plethora of procedures. It further relies on active membership in a “nuclear safety culture,” which is inflexible and stabilizing. However, the role of organized labor does provide a dichotomy or system of checks and balances of sorts, for which union members are afforded certain protection for disagreeing with the norm, so long as it does not subvert the need for safety or reliability. The ninth characteristic is the orientation between task and relationship, which Schein advocates a balance between the two. He notes the importance of task, which is often emphasized in the nuclear organization due the strong engineering element of its secondary dimension of diversity. This is another area where the nuclear organization must work to achieve balance, thus placing more emphasis on building relationships. The final characteristic concerns field logic, where systemic thinking has been identified as being more conducive to the learning culture.
Nuclear experts such as Montgomery and Scalia model a much simpler environment for organizational learning, which contains four basic elements; vision, culture, a principled value system, and leadership support.[17] For the nuclear industry, the vision may be to prove that nuclear energy is a safe, reliable, and cost-effective alternative to conventional generation: the antithesis of course, would lead to the end of the industry. The organizational culture would reflect the values, practices, and history of the parent organization with respect to approaching efficiency and allocating resources. The principled value system is likely synonymous with the static nature of the sociotechnical system, or safety culture. Leadership support optimizes organizational design, cultivates positive behaviors, and demands performance at all levels of the organization.
The two models, while appearing quite different in
approach, represent much the same difference between culture management and
transformational leadership as approaches to organizational development. The
culmination of the two represent the multidimensional characteristics that must
be considered in such a dynamic industry, and to denounce a turnkey “cookie
cutter” approach to managing the nuclear organization. The nuclear organization
needs a systemic, or holistic approach, but may also need to assure that all
components are properly identified – such as building a better understanding of
the dynamics of human relationships and culture.
Implementing
a System of Learning
The nuclear industry, for the most part, already has learning systems in place to meet both internal and external needs. Internally, the learning system continually focuses on the task, element, or event to determine the contributing factors for a deviation of the norm, or of an expectation. The deviation is documented in a deviation event report (DER), which identifies an objective assessment of the deviation, and is generally written by the worker closest to the deviation. The finder of the deviation also documents any immediate corrective actions taken. After it is written, the DER is “initially” screened and categorized by functional area and apparent cause for follow-up by the department involved. The deviation is also identified in level of importance. The investigating department researches what the planned outcome was to be, usually by researching the controlling procedure, policy, or plan. After performing a root cause analysis and identifying all of the contributing factors, a corrective action plan is developed, which seeks to mitigate a repeat event through modifying procedures to better isolate contributing factors. All of the steps of this DER process are logged into a computerized database for future cross-reference: The process provides a mechanism to gauge repeat incidences, and the similarity of contributing factors. This analysis helps determine which components of the system need to be modified, sets long-term corrective actions, and creates accountability for a definitive completion date.
An appropriate learning system would have to recognize all of the general organizational factors identified by Jacobs and Haber. The DER system works well to manage the development of administrative knowledge, thus standardizing work, keeping procedures and policies current, without contradictory information and ambiguity in interpretation. Increasing administrative knowledge is generally beneficial internally, but is often shared with the industry when deviations are related to component failure, defective parts, or process improvements that further safety and reliability. The DER also serves as a mechanism of communication, placing issues of system failures or deviations in a form accessible to all plant employees. Employees learn about deviations, and are able to build issues into their memory to aid and develop their forward thinking: the employees’ ability to recognize the potential for deviations before performing work. One criticism, however, would be communicating long-term corrective actions, which generally involves only the parties closest to the event. The system has also been used for deviations in human performance, which generally are reactive rather than proactive. These DERs are perceived as more disciplinary related, than as a learning mechanism, or a means to identify system failure. Little emphasis on human resource allocation or culture are apparent, which is surprising when considering that such a system does not work effectively unless all employees at all levels participate in the problem identification and corrective action programs. Additionally, the DER system does not effectively capture the effects of internal and external relationships between the company, management, union, and employee. Such findings further the argument for an elevation in importance of the human resource function, and the need for a more “holistic” approach, which emphasizes relational management as a means of mitigating organizational factors that affect performance.
Zangari and Cavaleri present “Relational Management” as an
alternative to traditional command and control systems.[18]
Their approach is based on “developing a useful knowledge of how relationships
affect performance in organizations,” and managing “the reciprocal pattern of
relationships that emerge over time.” Such an approach has distinct merit in
the nuclear industry considering the emphasis on fitness for duty, which is
both metal and physical: the intent being to minimize error by controlling
negative factors that effect performance. Currently the industry takes credit
for achieving this measure through rigorous pre-employment psychological
evaluations, random drug testing, and continual behavioral observation
programs. However, this approach is only effective for detecting aberrancy,
rather than the latent issues that may be caused by any variety of internal or
external dynamics. Thus, the concept of relational management calls for renewed
rapport between supervisor and employee: one that extends further than the
worksite, and is concerned with more than immediate on-the-job performance.
The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), an industry professional group that advocates operating standards and self-regulation, began initiating a program in 1997 to address the emphasis on changing the employee-management relationship in effort to create an environment conducive to organizational learning and high-performance. The “Excellence in Human Performance,” program[19] is a change model designed to present a new focus that recognizes the effects of individual behavior, management, leadership practices, and organizational processes and values on the frequency of human error. This realignment is designed to facilitate organizational processes and values that support desired behaviors. While the approach is innovative by way of addressing the organizational factors that hinder human performance and organizational learning, it stops short of advocating “soft-people-skills.” Much of the industry’s management paradigm continues to be tied to the nuclear navy’s system of “discipline” and “commitment” which resulted from the systems of rank and interpersonal reliance of naval officers and sailors: everyone lived together and relied on one another, knowing full-well that the failure of any one man would jeopardize the entire crew. The same principles prevail today in the commercial sector, yet the people are no longer as connected or interdependent because work and non-work are separate. However, outside influences effect performance, and must be recognized and managed through relational management.
In short, the industry has done well to manage organizational learning with respect to administrative knowledge, communication, and decision making as approached from a technical and performance perspective. However, they have failed to recognize the importance of latent organizational weaknesses resulting from the lack of relational management, which affects human resource allocation and culture. Advocating soft-people skills and professional management over technical expertise is paramount to successful implementation.[20]
Benefits to
the Nuclear Organization
The nuclear industry would benefit greatly from a properly implemented system of organizational learning, which would create greater efficiency and further the primary operating objectives of safety and reliability. The learning organization would create a self-sustaining organization that is able to continually change to meet the market expectations of a competitive environment, without compromising core values of the sociotechnical system. This will be increasingly important as t